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ARTHUR HEATH,  
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 (D.C. Crim. No. 2:10-cr-00565) 
District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
______________ 
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Before: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges. 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Arthur Heath (“Heath”) was convicted by a jury in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of a single count of gun possession 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  He was sentenced to sixty months of imprisonment 
and now appeals his conviction and sentence.  We hold that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in allowing evidence of Heath’s flight and resistance to arrest to be 
introduced at trial.  For the reasons stated herein, we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment and sentence.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the 
essential facts. 
On August 24, 2010, members of the United States Marshals Warrant Squad 
sought to arrest Arthur Heath on an arrest warrant issued in May 2010.  The marshals 
surrounded a residence located at 1733 Edgley Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  
Immediately after announcing their presence, marshals stationed in the rear of the home 
saw Heath throw a gun out of a barred window. The gun fell to the ground and was later 
recovered and identified as a loaded nine-millimeter Glock semi-automatic pistol.  Heath 
escaped from the residence onto the roof of the building.   
Roughly two hours after Heath’s escape, the marshals found him hiding in the 
basement of a nearby residence.  Heath refused requests to surrender.  Initially, the 
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marshals were unable to subdue Heath, even with the use of tasers.  Sometime later, with 
additional efforts, he was taken into custody.  Law enforcement officers on the scene 
identified him as the person whom they had seen throw the gun from the window of 1733 
Edgley Street earlier that day.  
Heath was indicted on one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  He submitted a pretrial motion in limine to exclude 
evidence that he fled from police and resisted arrest.  The District Court denied the 
motion.  A jury found Health guilty.  He was sentenced to sixty months of imprisonment.   
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction from the District Court’s final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
“review the district court’s decision to admit evidence of prior ‘bad acts’ under Rule 
404(b) for an abuse of discretion.”  United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 
2006) (citation omitted). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Heath alleges that the District Court abused its discretion in denying his motion in 
limine to exclude from trial evidence indicating that he fled from the police and resisted 
arrest.  The District Court admitted the evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence because his flight from police indicated consciousness of guilt as opposed to 
proving an essential element of the crime charged.  Consequently, we consider four 
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factors in determining whether the District Court abused its discretion in allowing the 
evidence under Rule 404(b):  (1) whether it was introduced for a permissible purpose; (2) 
whether it was relevant; (3) whether its probative value outweighs its potential for unfair 
prejudice; and (4) whether the District Court provided a limiting instruction that 
“charge[s] the jury to consider the evidence only for the limited purposes for which it 
[was] admitted.”  United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 460 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing 
Huddleston v. United States 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988)); see also United States v. 
Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 320-21 (3d Cir. 2002). 
We have previously stated that “‘[o]ther acts’ evidence satisfies the first two 
requirements if it is ‘probative of a material issue other than character.’”  Cross, 308 F.3d 
at 321 (quoting Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685); see also Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (allowing 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to be admitted for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident).  The Government avers that the evidence of Heath’s flight and 
resisting arrest are probative in that they indicate his consciousness of guilt.  It further 
asserts that the District Court’s decision to admit the evidence comports with Rule 404(b) 
because it was not being used to prove Heath’s character “in order to show action in 
conformity therewith.”  Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).  We agree that evidence of consciousness 
of guilt is relevant and we find that evidence admitted for this purpose is proper under 
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Rule 404(b).  We, therefore, find that the first two prongs of the Givan/Huddleston test 
are met.       
We afford the District Court great deference in reviewing its consideration of the 
third prong of the test.  United States v. Universal Rehab. Serv. (PA) Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 
665 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that because the trial judge is “in the best position to assess 
the extent of the prejudice caused a party, [he] must be given a very substantial discretion 
in balancing probative value on the one hand and unfair prejudice on the other.”) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  In order to justify reversal, we would have to find 
the District Court’s analysis and resulting conclusion to be arbitrary or irrational.  Id. 
(citation and quotation marks omitted).  We see no basis for such a conclusion in this 
case.  The District Court carefully measured the relevance and probative value of the 
evidence reflecting consciousness of guilt and weighed it against the danger of unfair 
prejudice, concluding that the majority of the resulting prejudice did not qualify as unfair.  
Consequently, we find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding 
that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice. 
Finally, the District Court satisfied the fourth prong of the test by providing a 
limiting instruction for the evidence of flight and resisting arrest.  The Court explained 
that the testimony relating to the flight and resisting arrest “was presented on the potential 
issue of consciousness or awareness of guilt.”  App. 123.  It further explained how the 
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jury could consider such evidence stating, “if you conclude that [Heath] fled or did the 
other things because of an awareness of his culpability in this case, then that’s an 
inference that you could make with respect to consciousness of guilt.”  App. 124.  
Finally, the Court explicitly instructed the jury that “flight or resistance standing alone 
without anything else are not sufficient to establish guilt.”  Id.  We find that such an 
instruction clearly fulfills the Givan/Huddleston requirement.   
The District Court properly applied Rule 404(b) in admitting evidence of Heath’s 
flight and resisting arrest.  We, therefore, conclude that the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in allowing the evidence at trial. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, and for those articulated by the District Court, we 
will affirm the District Court’s judgment and sentence.  
 
